



IN the June issue of the Yale Law Journal 1 I proposed outright estab,
lishrrent of prudent investment as the rate base for future regulation of
public utilities, as now permitted by the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Hope Natural Gas Company case.
2
The establishment of a prudent investment rate base would require initial
determination of (1) the original construction cost of all the plant and
equipment used in furnishing public service, and (2) the past depreciation
of the properties due to all causes, both physical and functional. The ac-
counts of each company would be rewritten accordingly. The initially
adopted rate base would consist of the original cost as entered in the plant
accounts, less the depreciation as shown by the adjusted depreciation reserve,
plus definite accounting provisions for working capital. Subsequently, fur-
ther accruing depreciation would be charged regularly to operating expenses
and would be added or credited to the reserve; new construction would be
entered in the plant accounts at actual cost; and the original cost of items
retired (less salvage) would be deducted both from the plant accounts and
from the reserve.
With such continuous accounting the balance of all the plant accounts
would present at any time the original cost of the properties in service, and
the reserve would show their total accrued depreciation. The balance, plus
working capital, would be the prudent investment or the rate base, on which
the company's allowable return would be predicated. Shown directly by the
accounts, the rate base would not be subject to future revaluations. It would
involve no time-consuming and costly procedure for determination, as in
past rate- cases. It would conserve equally and definitely the rights of in-
vestors and consumers. Rate control would become a matter of systematic
administration, instead of intermittent and spasmodic brawls of litigation.
t Director, The American Public Utilities Bureau.
This article was prepared in collaboration with Mr. James M. Carroll, former City So-
licitor, Springfield, Massachusetts. We discussed extensively the basic ideas in connection
with recent Springfield utility cases; he aided in planning the article, made important sugges-
tions in the preparation of the manuscript, and, in particular, passed on the legal issues and
views that are presented.
1. Bauer, The Establishment and Adminisrtration of a "Prudent Investment" Rate Base
(1944) 53 YALE L. J. 495.
2. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
1944] DEPRECIATION AND EFFECTIVE RATE CONTROL 93
In thus presenting the prudent investment rate base, the earlier article
gave general consideration to the two depreciation problems, initial deter-
minations ' and subsequent accruals. 4 This article will consider more spe-
cifically the chief aspects of depreciation discussing, first, the nature of
depreciation and how it is properly ascertained and provided for, second,
past commission treatment of depreciation in accounting regulation and in
rate and capitalization cases, and third, the scope of existing depreciatin
and the importance of making proper and definite provisions for effective
public control. Finally, a reply will be made to the criticisms of the prudent
investment rate base contained in Mr. Samuel Ferguson's article in the Sep-
tember issue of the Journal.'
WHAT DEPRECIATION IS AND How IT Is PROPERLY ASCERTAINED
Depreciation is usually defined as decline in value, and for most purposes
this simple view is adequate. It signifies measurement of decrease compared
with a particular value at a prior time or with the cost of acquisition. It may
pertain to a business as a whole, to a special part of the business, to individ-
ual property items, or to an aggregate of plant units.
The term connotes (1) developing depreciation as time goes on (i.e., rate
of depreciation for a period of time), and (2) the amount of total accumu-
lated or accrued depreciation at any moment. However, the decline in value
concept as properly applied to ordinary business is objectionable in its appli-
cation to public utilities unless it is clearly understood that regulation has
to do with costs and not with values in the ordinary commercial sense. This
is particularly true where prudent investment, duly maintained, constitutes
the rate base. Although this is definitely a cost category, and not one of
value as that word is commonly used, the long years of "fair value" discus-
sion witnessed incessant economic and legal disputes over what was really
involved, costs or values. Fortunately, this source of confusion has at last
been removed, and commissions are now permitted, so far as the Supreme
Court is concerned, to proceed with regulation throughout on a cost rather
than a value basis.
Cost Allocation. From this cost standpoint, the depreciation concept as
embodied in modem regulatory utility accounting involves cost allocation
from plant or capital account to operating expenses, with corresponding
total accrual in the depreciation reserve.
During the economic usefulness of the individual plant units, or class of
units, their original cost is written off and charged to operating expenses
3. Bauer, supra note 1, at 508-10.
4. Id. at 510-11.
5. Ferguson, "Cost" as a Substitute for "Vahue" in Utility Rate Base Deterin:ation:
A Comnent on Dr. Bauer's Position (1944) 53 YALE L J. 721.
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in accordance with their decline in total effective serviceability. At any given
time the depreciation of existing plant items consists of the amount of their
original cost that has been written off to past operating expenses. The bal-
ance, or the depreciated cost, is applicable to future operation and consti-
tutes the prudent investment. In this manner plant and operating accounts,
if properly maintained, will furnish standards for regular and effective pub-
lic control.
This cost view of depreciation can be harmonized with value decline as
commonly referred to in public utility parlance. If cost is clearly kept in
mind, utility depreciation can be satisfactorily expressed as decline in ser-
vice value. When plant units are installed new, their cost is then recognized
as constituting their full service value and is entered accordingly in the
accounts; each item embodies the sum of its total future serviceability as
reflected by its cost. As time passes, the sum of economic serviceability
gradually decfeases with operation, and the cost is correspondingly charged,
or allocated, to operating expenses. Thus "decline in service value" can be
taken as defining depreciation for the purposes of public utility regulation.0
6. The following definition, taken from FEDERAL PowER Co2tsmissioN, UNIFORM Sys-
TE-M or ACCOUNTS FOa PUBLIC UTILITIES AND LICENSEES (1937) 5, presents the view of
depreciation that has come to be widely accepted for regulatory purposes:
"'Depreciation', as applied to depreciable electric plant, means the loss in ser-
vice value not restored by current maintenance, incurred in connection with the con-
sumption or prospective retirement of electric plant in the course of service from
causes which are known to be in current operation and against which the utility is
not protected by insurance. Among the causes to be given consideration are wear
and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy, obsolescence, changes in the
art, changes in demand and requirements of public authorities."
This definition is applied by the FPC to the original cost of the properties used in public ser-
vice and represents the same general perspective outlined in this article. The definitions and
discussions in the accounting textbooks usually lack precision and are applicable to ordinary
private business not subject to regulation of rates and other phases of public interest. The
clearest and most appropriate accountant's definition presents depreciation as "expired capi-
tal outlay." This is definitely a cost concept, developed by P. D. Leake, in DEPRECIATION AND
WASTING AssErs (1912). According to Leake's view, the purchase of a plant unit to be used
in operation for longer than one regular accounting period is charged to capital or plant
account at cost, which then "expires" as operation proceeds, and is correspondingly charged
to operating expenses and accumulated in the depreciation reserve. This concept and pro-
cedure agree with the cost perspective that is essential to effective regulation.
Apart from clarity of concepts, accountants accept the general cost view for plant
accounts and for depreciation provisions. However, they tend to regard as fundamental the
"principle" that the plant charges must reflect solely cost to the purchaser regardless of
the origiul initallation cost. While this view pertains properly to ordinary industrial acqui-
sitions, it should be modified in its application to public utilities, since these concerns are sub-
ject to an underlying.public interest whose conservation is the primary function of regu-
lation. The accounting standards, therefore, should conform with the regulatory purposes,
Because of the public' interest, the total cost to the purchaser is subject to classification to
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It should be emphasized, however, that this service value concept is definitely
a cost and not a value category. Value, as generally applied to unregulated
industrial properties, depends upon future net earnings above operating
costs and reflects such prices or rates charged for the products as can be
obtained under expected market conditions, without the regulatory restric-
tions to which public utility rates and earnings are subject.' In contrast,
service value is a cost quantum which must be established before rates can
be administratively fixed, and which serves as the basic element in their
determination. As here presented, it signifies depreciated or net costs,8 not
just original or gross costs. In its totality for any company it is equal to the
original cost of the properties kept in service, less their full depreciation
determined in relation to their original cost, plus working capital.'
Causes of Depreciation. The basic fact in declining service value as thus
defined is the diminishing balance of total serviceability, as time and opera-
tion proceed, due to physical and functional depreciation, as revealed by the
comparison of the existing plant units with available new ones.
From a purely physical point of view, existing units wear out or other-
wise deteriorate and must finally be retired. Such physical decline in ser-
vice'value can be either measured or reasonably estimated. 'When the orig-
inal cost is correspondingly allocated to operating expenses and is gradu-
ally replaced by an equal amount of assets kept back in the business by de-
preciation accounting, the full original investment is regularly conserved.
Depreciation due to fulnctional causes is less simple to perceive and more
difficult to determine. It reflects the changing relation of the existing plant
units and their net cost to available superior units and their cost. The exist-
ing units depreciate as improved or otherwise more suitable new ones become
show the original cost of plant in service and to present separately the pa3ment in excess
of original cost. The principle here is that the underlying public right is fixed vihen plant
investments are first made and is not prejudicially affected by subsequent sales and pur-
chases. For severe criticism on "principle," see Paton, Accounting Policies of the Federal
Power Commission (1944) 77 J. AccouNTANcy 432; in reply, see Bauer, Accounting Prin-
ciples of the Federal Power Commission (1944) 78 id. at 2S. See also Bauer, The Fuctloas
of Public Utility Depreciation Accountihw in TnE NEW YoRKx CERT r D PUruC AeCoUNT-
ANT, October, 1944.
7. The term value can be properly applied to a utility property only as the result after
the rates have been fixed and the earnings realized accordingly, as then established in the
consequent market prices of the company's outstanding securities. Such valut can be greater
or less than the "service value" or rate base depending upon the earnings as expected and
upon the investment market. With effective regulation, the value of a property nrmally
could not depart greatly from the underlying service value or rate base.
. "Rate base," "depreciated cost," "net cost," and "service value" will be used inter-
changeably in this article as embodying the same cost factors.
9. The working capital element of the rate base will be ignored in the rest of the discus-
sion, but it will be assumed to be subject to regular accounting determination along with the
plant costs and depreciation.
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available; the relative superiority of the available determines the deprecia-
tion of the actual. Replacement or substitution takes place when the supe-
riority of the available overbalances the entire cost of the existing. By this
time the full original cost has been recovered, provided the plant investment
has been systematically maintained by means of depreciation accounting.
In most utility properties, and especially in the case of electric companies,
physical depreciation is normally blanketed by the functional. The latter
has two general causes: scientific and technological progress in available
plant units and shifts in service requirements. Functional decline due to
progressive improvements in available units is termed obsolescence. As
plant improvements become available, either in manufactured units or in
methods of construction, existing units depreciate and are ultimately super-
seded when the balance of over-all economy requires acquisition and opera-
tion of the new. The relation is expressed in the following general equa-
tion of relative costs:
Interest or return on the depreciated cost of actual plant units +
their greater operating expenses and maintenance = interest or
return on the full cost of available new units + their lower oper-
ating expenses and maintenance.
Both sides of the equation are calculable in relation to full or regular plant
operation. When the balancing of over-all cost per unit of product or ser-
vice results in zero service value for the old, it is replaced by the new, except
as items may economically be kept in reserve at zero to meet peak service
demands and special operating contingencies.Y
Functional depreciation caused by shifts in service requirements may
result from increasing or decreasing demands upon existing plant or from
changes imposed by public authority. Increasing service demands produce
so-called inadequacy. As service requirements advance, existing units gradu-
ally reach the point of complete inadequacy and have to be replaced by larger
units, or supplemented. If inadequacy is met by direct replacement, the
original cost gradually expires up to the point of replacement. If, however,
inadequacy is met, not by direct displacement, but by supplementary installa-
tion, the measurement of accruing depreciation involves all the related
facilities. Their total depreciation at any time is equal to an amount which
leaves their combined net plant cost equal to the full cost of a comprelien-
sive new layout of required service capacity, taking into account the dif-
ferences in relative operating expenses."
10. Such extra capacity may be supplied either by old units at zero net cost or by new
units at full cost.
11. This phase of inadequacy is widely prevalent, but it is less apparent and its deter-
uination is more complicated than simple replacement. It is therefore usually obscured and
largely ignored although it commonly exists. Its ascertainment again involves comparison
of actual with available plant units.
[Vol. 54: 92
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While service requirements normally increase, they sometimes diminish.
When this is true, existing plant units depreciate as their original cost ex-
ceeds the cost of new units adequate for the lower service needs. This phase
of functional depreciation has never received a specific name, but in con-
trast to inadequacy it represents over-adequacy of existing units compared
with appropriate new ones.
Shifts in service conditions appear also with reference to plant location,
especially as required by public authorities. For example, street changes
may necessitate the relocation or placement underground of electric lines.
While such prospective shifts may be less subject to prevision than the de-
velopment of inadequacy or over-adequacy, they nevertheless affect the
remaining serviceability of the existing property units. Where the changes
may reasonably be anticipated, they are properly included in the deprecia-
tion accounting, provided that the cost of relocation is payable by the com-
pany and thus by the consumers.1 "
Relation of the Actual to the Available. The concept that functional de-
preciation of the actual units in service is due to the progressive availability
of superior new ones has not received general recognition. It is seldom
avowed even by those who insist upon full operating provision for func-
tional as well as physical changes. While they recognize that original cost
must be conveyed to operation during the period of economical operation,
so that the full amount will be recovered in retained assets by the time of
retirement, they seldom see clearly that the declining service value through-
out the period depends upon an over-all cost comparison of the old units
with the progressively available new.
Sometimes functional decline is correlated with loss of efficiency or other
suitability within the existing plant units themselves. This view, of course,
is untenable. If, for example, obsolescence were caused by loss of operating
efficiency by the units in service, without comparison with superior avail-
able units, there would be little obsolescence. Most plant items maintain
substantially their original efficiency for operation up to the time of retire-
ment and are scrapped or rendered useless only because they are too ineffi-
cient compared with up-to-date new units. What causes functional depre-
12. The question sometimes arises whether the regular depreciation charges -h,,uld
also include provisions for plant contingencies and casualties. In general, as to perating
function, it should not. Depreciation consists only of decreases in service value that
develop in the course of operation. Destruction of properties by storms, fluods, fires, etc.,
is properly covered by insurance or by some special accounting prtovision (by the crea-
tion of a separate contingency reserve, or by first charging e.'traordinary lusses to an
asset suspense account and then amortizing them over a reasonable period of years).
While all such losses should be absorbed as cost in the operating e-%prnses and paid for
by consumers, they do not constitute depreciation. However, regular proviioans for them
can be included in the charges to operating expenses, su that the resirve Vill c,,ver
not only the accrued depreciation but also accumulations fur plant casualties,. Mim,!r
losses are best charged directly to operating expenses along with ordinary maintaiance.
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ciation is not internal loss of serviceability but external progress, with exist-
ing plant units depreciating as better ones become available. The term
"economic" serviceability has been used to designate the equated usefulness
of the actual units in relation to the superior new ones that are available.
Physical serviceability, on the other hand, could be obtained without due
regard to relative efficiency and suitability for economical operation.3
While comparative serviceability furnishes a clear view of accruing depre-
ciation, the rate or amount can seldom be calculated with fine accuracy and
must therefore be subject to adjustment with passing time. Estimates have
to be made in advance for considerable periods, including, at the outset, the
total expected life of newly installed plant units. Consequently, precise cor-
respondence between the accounting and the underlying forces of func-
tional decline cannot be maintained. If, however, long-distance judgments
are subject to constant revision in the light of technological and service de-
velopments, intelligent management and regulation can keep the accounting
provisions substantially in harmony with the actual depreciation.
The Straight Line Method. For the purpose of making regular provisions
for depreciation accounting, the so-called straight line method has received
extensive approval by competent analysts and regulatory bodies. It involves,
first, an initial estimate of the total economic service life of the plant units as
installed, and, second, the allocation of their original cost (less expected
salvage) to operating expenses in equal periodic amounts.
The method is simple and can be accepted as furnishing an accounting
standard which is practical and. reasonable throughout. Its characteristics,
however, should be understood, and it should be subject to continuous man-
agerial and regulatory scrutiny for needed adjustments. If the original life
expectations should prove wrong, an appropriate change in the time basis
should be made. Furthermore, while the formula sometimes has received
doctrinal credence As if it furnished per se the basic measure of depreciation,
actually it does not in itself provide for regular economic cost equalization
of old units with available new ones. Such comparison would generally
reveal relatively greater depreciation during the earlier years of the total
economic.life, producing, instead of a straight line, a descending one. This
would correspond with the usual operating fact that newly installed plant
units are devoted as steadily as possible to the main service loads while older
13. A special phase of functional depreciation that is usually overlooked appears
when new sub-units are installed in connection with a general plant layout that has in-
curred extensive obsolescence. While such new units may be economically justified and
properly entered in the plant accounts at their full installation cost, actually they are
then functionally as depreciated as the corresponding or associated old units. They
are as obsolete as is the plant as a whole. Their immediate depreciation should not be
obscured. The over-all provisions for the plant as a whole should be adequate to cover
the total depreciation incurred in regard to all the units installed at the various stages of
the entire plant's developing obsolescence. ,
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ones are relegated to successively less important functions until they are
finally retired from service. For most kinds of plant units a schedule of
diminishing annual depreciation would correspond better to the underlying
facts than the straight line method of equal annual allocations to operating
expenses.
To attempt such precise adjustments of annual depreciation for the dif-
ferent classes of plant would doubtless involve an amount of technical and
accounting detail that would not be justified as a regular operating matter.
Moreover, total plant usually consists of an aggregate of various short- and
long-lived units, and of old, new and in-betveen items, as a result of gradual
additions, improvements and replacements that extend back over many
years. Under such conditions, the straight line method can be accepted as
a satisfactory average means of providing regularly for depreciation if it
is used intelligently and not blindly as a formula.'4
Reserves and Actual Depreciation. Practical treatment of depreciation,
of which the straight line method is an example, raises the question whether
accounting provisions can ever, or normally, be accepted as the true meas-
ure of depreciation. At best, of course, determination of the actual involves
estimates as to which there can be substantial differences of opinion between
persons with like general views, purposes, ability and integrity.
If, however, clear perspective guides the initial and subsequent findings,
adjustments in accounting can reasonably approximate the actual deprecia-
tion. Furthermore, under definite regulatory standards and procedure, the
showing of the accounts, once officially established, would furnish the sole
measure of the actual depreciation with validity for rate-making and other
regulatory and financial purposes. The charges and reserve as once ap-
proved would stand as final at that time, and all needed adjustments wuLuld
be reflected in the subsequent charges to operating expenses and in the cor-
responding reserve accruals.
This assumes definite standards and systematic accounting provisions for
reguluatory purposes. Unfortunately, no such standards have existed in the
past or prevail now, but they should be adopted for the future. If they are,
the first step is to obtain proper initial accounting adjustments in the show-
ing of original plant costs and accrued depreciation; subsequently, regular
depreciation provisions will be made according to sound managerial judg-
ment under commission control. If this is done, the total depreciation
14. Adjustment in annual depreciation charges and reserve accruals would be predi-
cated primarily upon different functional development than had been previously e%pected.
In the case of obsolescence, for exzample, it would usually be due to faster or slower
technological advancement. It might be due also to shifts in price levels or construction
costs, so that the period of economic serviceability would be extended or shortened by
the prospect of a higher or lower level of plant costs with which operating cromparisons
would be made.
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accounted for will always be reasonably close to underlying actualities and
can be taken as an exact amount in dealing with relative public and private
rights. The objective is definiteness, with reasonable assurance of sound
financial policy, equal justice to consumers and investors, and regula-
tion predicated upon recognized showing of facts rather than upon the
morass of opinion and conjectures which was typical of the old type of rate
case procedure.
Relation to Reproduction Cost. Inasmuch as the depreciation. of the
actual plant units is correlated with the cost of available new ones, it may be
asked whether the result is not equivalent to appraisal at reproduction cost
new less depreciation. Since outright reproduction cost less depreciation
has been the determining part of the past "fair value" standard, why this
legal and accounting strain to substitute prudent investment?
The answer appears chiefly in the definiteness and administrability there-
by attained. While, theoretically, original cost less depreciation as here pre-
sented has similarity to reproduction cost less depreciation correspondingly
computed (if the relative quantities are comparably determined through-
out), the adoption of prudent investment would simplify the determination
of the rate base and would eliminate conflicts of interest. Both original cost
and depreciation, when once initially ascertained and embodied in the ac-
counts, could subsequently be shown as definite amounts through regular
accounting procedure. Except for possible extravagant or otherwise un-
warranted plant charges, which would be disallowed immediately by the
commission, there would be exactness and life permanence in the plant costs
as currently incurred and entered in the accounts. Accruing depreciation
would be predicated upon managerial and regulatory judgment; but it would
be computed according to established standards and procedure involving no
conflict of interest between consumers and investors. Neither side would
gain any advantage by an excessive or inadequate periodical allowance, and
neither could rationally oppose proper provisions for depreciation as it
occurred. At any time the rate base would be shown b' the accounts as an
exact sum.
In contrast, when reproduction cost less depreciation is used, both factors
that enter into the net amount are not only difficult to ascertain but must
be redetermined with each rate inquiry. Because of opinion testimony and
lack of exact showing of facts, every step leading to rate base findings in-
volves basic conflicts, with the result that rate cases are cumbersome, costly,
time-consuming, and not manageable for regular and systematic administra-
tion. Under the consequent procedure, the private side is usually fully pre-
pared and expertly presented, while the public side goes extensively by de-
fault. Finally, when the rate base has been determined after protracted
proceedings in virtual litigation, the reproduction cost as found is almost
inevitably excessive and the depreciation inadequate, thus differing mate-
LVol. 54: 92
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rially or greatly in result from original cost less depreciation as shown by
accounts under continuous regulatory scrutiny.
My objection to the discarded "fair value" rule and my lung support of
prudent investment, with a definite accounting rate base, have never been
based upon conceived basic advantages for consumers as against investors.
Except for its lack of definiteness and determinability, I have not been op-
posed to reproduction cost less depreciation as such. Furthermore, unless
one ignores shifts in price levels and movements of cost, he can not escape
giving effect indirectly to the reproduction cost element. The prudent in-
vestment rate base doutbless involves, indirectly at least, an aspect of repro-
duction cost, but it keeps to exactness of factual showing, precludes conflicts
of basic interests, protects equally and definitely the relative rights of con-
sumers and investors, and provides for regular and systematic administra-
tion. Its administrability on the basis of factual definiteness is its compelling
claim to adoption for regulatory purposes.
CommIssION ACTION ON DEPRECIATION
Recent renunciations by the Supreme Court, especially in the Hope Nrat-
ziral Gas Cornmpany case,"0 have left regulatory bodies virtually supreme in
fixing rates without specific judicial restrictions affecting bases or meth-
ods."0 Even with respect to the remaining requirement that over-all results
represent a fair balance between investors and consumers," the burden
rests heavily upon the utilities to prove conclusively that there has been
injustice."
This new freedom does not relieve the commissions, however, from their
own responsibility for doing their work systematically, in continuous fair-
ness to both public and private interests, by planning and establishing im-
proved standards and procedures through which rate-making can be made a
matter of regular and definite administration predicated upon exact facts as
sho vn by the records and accounts.
15. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
16. "Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not
the method employed which is controlling .... It is not theory but the impact of the
rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to Ue unjust
and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the [Natural Gas] Act is at an end. The fact
that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then impr-
tant." Id. at 602.
17. "The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable'
rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." Id. at G03.
18. " ... the Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact that
it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of
validity. And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden
of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable
in its consequences." Id. at 602.
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As an important factor both in the rate base and in operating expenses,
depreciation received its share of judicial attention during the long contro-
versies over "fair value." "0 Now, within the limits of general fairness, the
commissions are left free to use independent discretion in making provisions
for depreciation in the total rate-making process. If this responsibility is
to be effectively discharged, traditional attitudes, standards and procedure
19. Depreciation was not mentioned in the original pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court on "fair value" in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898), first
appearing as a separate factor in Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (1908).
There, and in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913), the Court gave evidence
of recognizing both physical and functional depreciation. See especially 230 U. S. at 456,
458. The statement in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co. (1926), however, that the
"testimony of competent valuation engineers who examined the property and made esti-
mates in respect of its condition is to be preferred to mere calculations based on averageg
and assumed probabilities" (272 U. S. 400, 416) was widely interpreted as support for
depreciation deductions based exclusively upon physical inspection. In the same case the
Court further remarked, in rejecting a city estimate of the cost of a substitute steam
plant, that what was to be ascertained was "the value of the plant used to give the service
and not the estimated cost of a different plant" (id. at 417-8), a distinction which has since
been hurled against any consideration of available plant units in the determination of
the "fair value" of existing properties.
The Knoxville case made clear that past inadequate provisions in the charges to
operating expenses and in the accumulation of reserve would not prevent the full deduc-
tion of depreciation. However, the reverse situation of excessive depreciation charges
and reserve accumulations was not presented until Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. N. Y.
Telephone Co., 271 U. S. 23 (1926), where the offsetting of high past charges by a
reduction of current provisions for depreciation was not permitted. Following this tele-
phone case the position of the Court was generally accepted to be (1) that currently
accruing depreciation must be included in operating expenses, and (2) that total actual de-
predation is deductible from cost new in the determination of "fair value." Depreciation
charges were customarily based upon original cost, even though the rate base rested
primarily upon reproduction cost. United Rys. & Elect. Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S.
234 (1930), held, however, that depreciation allowances in operating expenses must also
be predicated upon reproduction cost.
Release of the commissions from unworkable restrictions has come since 1930. Lind-
heimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934), recognized that the de-
preciation provisions for operating expenses must be in harmony with the total deducted
for rate base determination, defining depreciation as "the loss . . . due to all the factors
causing the ultimate retirement of the property . . . [including] wear and tear, decay,
inadequacy, and obsolescence." Id. at 167. In Los Angeles Gas & Elect. Co. v. R. R,
Comr., 289 U. S. 287 (1933), the use of the actual cost of the properties rather than
reproduction cost was approved, and in Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942), the Court upheld the Commission in the fixing of rates on
the basis of original cost less full depreciation and in the inclusion in operating expenses
of accruing depreciation predicated on original cost. Finally, in Federal Power Comm. v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), it approved the deduction of total deprecia-
tion due to all causes from original cost in determining the rate base and the basing of
operating charges for accruing depreciation on original cost, explicitly overruling United
Rys. & Elect. Co. v. West mfpra. 320 U. S. at 606-7.
[Vol. 54: 92
1944] DEPRECIATION AND EFFECTIVE RATE CONTROL 103
will need thorough revision to meet the needs of constructive future regu-
lation.
Past commission dealing with depreciation as a direct regulatory matter
has largely reflected the general ineffectiveness of regulation in practice.
The reasons have included inadequate or restrictive statutory powers, judi-
cial restrictions and requirements, unclear perception, insufficient financial
and staff provisions, and political conditions.
The commissions have dealt with depreciation in performing three major
regulatory functions: (1) accounting, (2) rate-making, and (3) control
of security issues. In none have they adopted and applied definite standard
or protected systematically the relative public and private rights. While
their failure-has injured the consumers much more directly and extensively,
it has affected indirectly the investors, especially bond and preferred stoel:
owners, by not requiring adequate depreciation reserves and so permitting
extensive payment of common-stock dividends out of capital. Some billions
of outstanding public utility securities today have no investment support
and, upon definite reckoning between consumers and investors, will be left
without return.
The purpose here is not to berate the commissions but rather to Qxplain
how their failure to deal properly with depreciation came about and, esp:-
cially, to emphasize what they must do if regulation is to be reconqtituted
as an effective instrument of public policy. The reasons for past mistal:es
are understandable, but the necessary changes must be made if regulation
is to meet its institutional requirement. Where immense public and private
rights are involved, lackadaisical processes are intolerable and must be
replaced by measures which are constantly directed to clear objectives and
are regularly administered on the basis of definite rights and continuuus
showing of exact facts.
1. Lack of Power in Accounting. The basic obstacle in accounting regu-
lation has been inadequate legal authority and responsibility to deal com-
prehensively with depreciation. The commissions in general have had
neither the power nor duty to fix annual depreciation rates or to require
proper charges to operating expenses with corresponding accrual to depre-
ciation reserves.
Although the companies commonly have been required to report what was
actually done, they have been largely free to adopt annual depreciation rates
and" accounting in accordance with financial policies fixed by their boards
of directors. Usually the provisions have been inadequate. While at
times the commissions have applied non-legal pressures, they have generally
been ignored, although in recent years, especially upon action by the Federal
Power Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commissio n, thl:
annual depreciation charges have been substantially increased and higher
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relative reserves have been accumulated than had been the record up to
roughly the middle of the 1930s."°
The commissions should, of course, have full power and duty to require
the companies to make reasonable charges to operating expenses for all
causes of depreciation and to accumulate reserves accordingly. rFurther-
more, where past provisions have been inadequate, so that the reserves are
less than the actual physical and functional decline, they should have the
power and duty to make fair determinations and to order a corresponding
adjustment of the reserves. Unfortunately, no state commission is today
clothed with adequate legal authority and responsibility for such effective
accounting revision and control.
2. Rate Case Difficulties. While the commissions have not had appro-
priate powers in the field of regular accounting, they have had both the right
and duty to make due depreciation provisions in the fixing of reasonable
rates. This has applied both to the allowances for operating expenses and
to rate base deductions.
In dealing with this double aspect of depreciation in rate cases, the com-
missions have made the basic determinations. Their grave obstacle was the
method of factual ascertainment, depending not upon definite accounts and
records but upon expert opinions presented in quasi-judicial inquiries.
Under such procedures, as outlined above,21 the company's side was usually
prepared and presented in much more detail, and much more impressively,
than the consumers'. The determinations almost inevitably favored the com-
panies. This uneven treatment is evident in the common provisions for oper-
ating expenses in contrast to the rate base deductions. The commissions
have usually made allowances in operating expenses roughly or nearly in
accordance with the actually developing depreciation, with annual rates
ranging between 2 and 3 per cent on the cost new of the properties. But
after making such provisions in the rate paid by consumers, they have not
had the power to compel inclusion of equivalent charges in the companies'
accounts. Consequently, while total accruing depreciation was provided for
20. According to the FEDERAL POWER CONIMISSION'S STATISTICS OF ELECTIUC UTILITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1942, the ratio of total "reserves for depreciation and amortization
of utility plant" to "total utility plant" was 15.5% as of December 31, 1942, for all class A
and class B privately owned electric companies reporting to the Commission. The corres-
ponding ratio was 11.6% as of December 31, 1938. Id. at viii.
The controlling reason for inadequate past depreciation provisions was, presumably, a
financial one: to keep the showing of operating expenses as low as possible; and that of net
earnings as high as possible, so as to pay the dividends for the support of the overcapitalized
holding company structures. This was the prevalent situation with the electric systems,
However, with the telephone companies, and especially the natural gas companies, the situa-
tion was normally the reverse: excessive depreciation charges were usually made so as to
cover up high net earnings and so head off demands for rate reductions.
21. Supra, p. 100.
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in gross revenues, the companies continued to show lower annual costs and
higher net earnings than realized and to pay dividends accordingly on the
widely prevalent overcapitalization, passing them to the higher reaches
of holding company structures.
The immediate incongruity appears between the allowances for operating
expenses and the rate base deductions. As against the annual pruvisions of
2 to 3 per cent on the cost new of the properties, the total depreciation deduc-
tions have commonly ranged between 10 and 15 per cent, seldom as high as
20 per cent. These total percentages are obviously inconsistent with the
allowed annual depreciation rates. ,n annual rate of 2 per cent, in relation
to total depreciation of 10 or 15 per cent, involves an average plant age of
only 5 or 7.5 years, or only 10 years for a 20 per cent total. A 3 per cent
annual rate is equivalent to an average age of 3.4 years, 5 years, or 6.7 years,
to correspond with 10, 15 or 20 per cent total depreciation. Inasmuch as
the properties covered in the ordinary rate proceeding were developud over
a long period of years, with gradual additions and replacements extending
back at least 30 years and often over 50, the assumption of an average age
of only 5 to 10 years is absurd22 If the annual depreciation rate of 2 to 3
per cent is correct and is duly correlated with the ages of the various classes
of property, the total depreciation must be 30 per cent or over, the extent
depending upon the accumulation of old plant items that have little or noI
actual service value.
In presenting their planned and detailed expert testimony, the companies
have commonly and calmly ignored the inconsistency between the claimed
annual and the total depreciation. The consumer representatives have fre-
quently insisted, relying usually on general logic and analysis, that either the
annual depreciation provisions were grossly excessive or the total deprecia-
tion provisions were correspondingly inadequate. However, upon the rec-
ords of evidence presented, and upon previews of possible court action, the
commissions have followed the company position and claims more nearly
than logic and the underlying realities. They have certainly failed, on the
whole, to harmonize their findings on annual charges and on total deprecia-
tion.m3
3. Approval of Security Issues. The control of security issues presents
a third phase of commission treatment of depreciation. Where state statutes
22. While there should be correspondence between the annual charges and twtal deprecia-
tion, the annual rate multiplied by average age may not always give the correct ttal ercent-
age. This is due, in physical depreciation, to serial collapse ui the plant units within the esti-
mated average service life, and, in functional depreciation, to changes in the life estimates
as operation proceeds. However, though the results of multiplying annual rate ad age
cannot be followed as a simple formula, they furnish at least approximate indicatitn ,,f t,tal
depreciation for the different classes of property.
23. This was especially true prior to the middle 1930s.
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have provided for such regulation, both the language and the procedure as
adopted have usually disregarded altogether the factor of depreciation, ap-
proVal being predicated primarily upon the actual cost of the properties
installed.
The common practice has been for a company to make plant additions and
improvements on its own decision, paying for them out of corporate funds
or through short-term loans, typically demand notes not subject to commis-
sion control. Then, after such plant outlays have reached a substantial total,
the company has applied to the commission for approval to issue securities,
equal in amount to the expenditures, for the declared purpose of reimburs-
ing the corporate funds or repaying the temporary loans. At that point the
commission has sometimes required a staff investigation of plant additions
and retirements and has allowed new bonds or stock to be issued equal to the
plant additions less retirements made during the period covered by the peti-
tion, usually since a previous authorization was granted.
This procedure ignores the depreciation of the properties. Irrespective
of inadequacy of the reserve or of the accrual of depreciation during the
period covered, the authorization is predicated exclusively upon the so-called
net plant additions (the cost of the new, less the cost of the retired), and
approval is normally granted even where the previously outstanding securi-
ties exceed the prudent investment in properties devoted to public service.
The standard disregards prior overcapitalization and does not even take
into account depreciation accruing between approvals. While it deducts
retirements as made, it fails to include in that deduction fully depreciated
plant units kept in pretended service to sustain high rate base valuations
or to support excessive security issuances.
Apart from dealing with prior overcapitalization, the correct standard
would be to approve new securities only to the extent of increase in total
plant costs over further accrued depreciation during the period covered. The
allowance should equal the total plant expenditures, less the plant retire-
ments and the additional plant depreciation. Furthermore, it should not
be limited to reimbursement of funds already expended but should be predi-
cated at the outset upon an approved construction program. The public inter-
est is affected by the very plans and acts of construction, not merely by sub-
sequent financial standards in approving security issues 4
24. Many examples can be cited of commissions' disregard of the public interest in deal-
ing with depreciation in rate cases, security issues, plant retirements and other phases of regu-
lation. Three recent cases of which I have first-hand knowledge are here summarized. [In
the first two Mr. James M. Carroll represented the City of Springfield as Solicitor while I
was engaged as economic adviser and expert.]
The first is a rate case following a complaint filed by the Mayor of the City of Springfield,
Massachusetts, against the United Electric Light Company of that city, with the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Utilities (hereinafter referred to as DPU) in Case No. 5943,
June 16, 1941. This commission had always given lip service to the prudent investment rate
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Improvement in Standards. While past commission dealings with depre-
ciation in the various phases of regulation involving public and private
base concept but had never taken a clear position on the regulation of the originally prudent
plant expenditures to their subsequent depreciation. In this case the City contended that the
company's steam generating plant was completely depreciated because of its age and conse-
quent inefficiency, compared with an available new plant. The old plant regularly required
about two pounds of coal per kilowatt hour generated while less than one pound is needed
by a new modern plant. But, since the plant was still "used and useful" as a standby, DPU
allowed the original cost as included in the plant accounts to remain in the base up-,n which
rates were fixed. While the original construction was doubtless prudent, the entire cost
should have been charged off to past operating expenses and covered fully in the deprecia-
tion reserve. The records showed, moreover, that past rates paid by cnsumers had been
more than adequate to provide fully for accruing depreciation and to pay a return of more
than 6 per cent on prudent investment. The DPU adopted as the rate base the original cost of
the plant minus only the company-reported reserve predicated on inadequate past charge-s to
operating expenses for depreciation. The next year (1942), in a Federal Po wer C"mmissbvn
hearing on the consolidation of the United Electric Light CQmpay with tther operating
companies, the Chief Engineer of United admitted the steam plant was unecon mical and
not in regular use except as a relay center and that necessary power was therefore purchased
from the Hartford Electric Light Company of Hartford directly or thr,ugh assc4ciatcid com-
panies.
The second case, Petition of Springfield Street Ry., Mass. DPU, C.ase No. 0945 11943),
involved a series of orders of the DPU relating t.# the co,mplete alandkinment in 1940 .of a
street railvay system and the substitution therefor of motor husvs. Practically wo pr,,visin
had been made for past depreciation. Consequently, the clean eliminatiin fr.m the balance
sheet of the road-and-equipment item representing trolley op-ration wo. uld have revealed a
large corporate deficit. The stock had been approved when issued and then doultles repre-
sented prudent investment. But the plant back of the stiuck wa nut maintained and %v,
gradually depreciated and abandoned through the years, with the nmajo.r changeover t... buses
taking place in 1940. This rhsulted in the entire property back .f thu t,tal ',tcl_ i'sue bzing
dissipated. Nevertheless, the DPU, over the objection of the City ,o4 Sprivgfield and nearby
communities, authorized the transfer of the bulk of the dead a-,t tv an asset suspnse
account and then approved the amortization of these acc.,unts through charget, -o.pratirg
expenses as current depreciation. The DPU thus saved the company frcm showing th a.t'unl
deficit, ignored basic standards of preserving prudent investment, and authorized an acc.,unt-
ing set-up which will naturally be used by the company to sustain excessive bus fares.
The third case was before the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission and involved the
New Haven Water Company. In re New Haven Water Co., Docket No. 7075, June 21, 1943,
49 P.U.R. (N.s.) 229, 236-40. The issue was the functional depreciatiun of the io,,rr chief
water supplies which were stated at a total book cost of $€3,395,000, and had a safe daily pro-
duction capacity of about 23 million gallons. When this supply had become inadeqjuate, a
new source was developed at a cost of 7,12.,00D. This furnished a safe daily addition of 15
million gallons; but with the extension that had been part of the comprehensive plan an addi-
tion of 24 million gallons a day could be obtained at a further outlay of about C,00,090,
which would eliminate the need for the old supplies. My position was that the depreciation
of the old supplies was properly determined in relation to the cost of the available substitute.
and involved primarily an equated relative cost of determination. Id. at 239. While there
were pluses and minuses for other minor factors whose amounts could not be established
with desirable exactness (as is commonly true in rate cases), they were evidently not con-
trolling in the decision. The deciding view was that I had shifted from the prudent invest-
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interests have been unsatisfactory, the prospects for improvement appear
encouraging. First, the commissions have already applied pressur for
more adequate depreciation charges to operating expenses. Second, they
are tending more to require congruity in rate case findings between oper-
ating expense allowances and total depreciation. Third, they are moving
toward harmonization of regular accounting with rate base needs and
toward the development and application of standards that depend upon
definite factual showing rather than upon opinion testimony and quasi-
judicial procedure. Fourth, they have been released from the previous
shackling by judicial requirements and restrictions.
The progress made in general position and attitude is striking in the
accounting field. During recent years the National Association of Railroad
and Public Utility Commissioners has had a special committee on deprecia-
tion accounting, which in 1943 issued a comprehensive document known
as the NARUC depreciation report.2" This embodies, in the main, the
standards that have been adopted and applied by the Federal Power Com-
mission and the more advanced state commissions. It recommends the
adoption of the straight line method of determining annual depreciation
charges, providing for current functional decline as well as for physical
wear and deterioration, and predicates the annual depreciation rates upon
the original cost and the total expected service life of the various classes of
property. While some minor criticism can validly be made, the report marks
a new era in commission accounting standards.2"
The report also takes a quite positive stand on corrections that should be
made for inadequate past provisions for depreciation. It recommends that
the reserves be adjusted to the annual depreciation charges and proposes
retroactive application of the current depreciation rates to the ages of the
various plant items. The plant accounts of a company would show the actual
ment in the actual plant to an evaluation of a hypothetical substitute plant. Although the
Commission was undoubtedly sincere, its position, I submit, involves a grave economic mis-
apprehension. While the rate base determination must, of course, pertain to the actual plant,
how can the findings of functional depreciation be intelligently reached except by comparing
the efficiency and suitability of the existing plant units with superior available ones?
25. REPORT OF CoMMITTEE ON DEPRECIATION OF NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF RAILROAD
AND UTILITIES COMMISSONERS (1943).
26. There had been considerable floundering among commissions in providing for depre-
ciation accounting. In the earlier classifications, the official accounting usually provided for
depreciation as such, sometimes under such title as "amortization of fixed capital." How-
ever, during the 1920s there was extensive official shift to so-called retirement accounting,
providing, for both the annual charges and the reserves, amounts sufficient only to equalize
plant retirements over five to ten years. This change was sanctioned by the NARUC, partly
no doubt under private utility influences and partly perhaps to recognize the actual account-
ing practice of the companies. The recent reverse shift, returning to outright depreciation
accounting, has been led particularly by the federal commissions and reflects the more recent
realistic and positive consideration of the public interest by most regulatory bodies.
0
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original cost of the properties used in service, and the reconstructed depre-
ciation reserve would present the part of the original cost that is properly
applicable to past operation. The balance would show the remaining net
plant investment.
All this is good modern accounting. The report is somewhat tender, how-
ever, in applying its retroactive recommendations to a company whose
adjusted reserves would result in showing a balance sheet deficit. Such a
situation would, of course, raise a question of policy: is it better to avoid
outright showing of insolvency and to force corporate reorganization or to
cover up the actuality and assist the company in placing the burden of re-
attaining solvency upon the consumers without corporate reorganization?
The answer should be plain. Where past rates have been adequate to
cover all operating costs and a fair return, but inadequate depreciation
charges have been made, there can be no injustice if the depreciation re-
serves are now rewritten upon full retroactive application of proper annual
percentages. Where past rates have not been sufficient to cover all costs
along with depreciation and a fair return, revision of the reserve should
still be made if the fault for not getting adequate earnings was the com-
pany's because of inefficient operation or failure to apply for justified rate
increases. Where industry conditions precluded a fair return above all
operating costs, proper charges for depreciation should have ben made
ahead of return, and full reserve adjustment again appears justified. On
the other hand, where past rates as fixed by commission order did not pro #-
vide adequately for depreciation, and where no more than a fair return was
obtained, retroactive revision of the reserve would he unjust, and the re-
quired adjustment should, of course, take into account the past rate restric-
tions. Such instances, however, are rare since the commissions have vir-
tually always allowed full depreciation for operating expenses in rate cases.
In the great majority of instances no substantial issue of fairnes's can he
raised by complete reserve adjustments. 7
PREVALENT DEPRECIATION AND NEEDED ADJUSTMXENT
If a generally fair and definite rate base is to be established, the major
problem is the initial determination of total existing depreciation. Once
27. Perhaps it is inept to view the present adjustments in the depreciation reserves as
retroactive application of current depreciation rates. The term "retroactive' has a sinister
and oppressive connotation. Actually the adjustments involve no retroactive impact in the
real economic and legal sense. They merely bring the reserve accounts up to the depreda-
tion that has, in fact, taken place. Inasmuch as legally and procedurally actual deprecation
is deductible from the cost new of the properties in the rate base determinatiuns, there is no
ex post facto penalty upon the companies if the reserves are adjusted to the underlying
realities that must be evaluated in dealing effectively with relative public and private rights.
Such demarcation becomes significant in the rate-making process. The proposed accounting
adjustments would greatly facilitate the continuous showing of those relative rights but
would not alter their basic content and amount.
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these findings have been made and entered into the accounts, subsequent
provisions for further accruing depreciation will involve no particular con-
flicts of interest and no special difficulties of ascertainment.
The rate base for each company can then be shown as an exact amount
beyond the realm of dispute. However, the initial findings of depreciation
will necessitate detailed inspection of the properties and thorough analysis
of the operating suitability of the various units. The work can be kept
within manageable confinds, but it will place substantial burdens upon the
fact-finding bodies. It will require clear perception of what is involved, the
adoption of workable standards and procedure, and the use of skilled per-
sonnel.
Extent of Existing Depreciation. To make clear the importance of the
task a rough indication of th6 extent of existing depreciation may be useful.
This will be limited to the electric industry, but similar conditions are preva-
lent in other utilities.
In considering any electric generating plant and its depreciation, a clear
understanding of modern plant standards is essential. Under present condi-
tions large central stations of high efficiency are available for virtually all
distribution areas. For the most part, therefore, the over-all cost of such
modern generation furnishes the measure of depreciation in the existing
plants. The best example is electric generation by steam as measured by use
of coal. A large modern plant (except for war conditions) can usually be
constructed for not more than $100 per kilowatt of installed capacity and
can be operated at an average coal consumption of about 0.75 lb. per kilo-
watt hour. However, for 1942 the Federal Power Commission reported
total bituminous coal consumption of 64,372,000 short tons for production
of 100,569,000,000 kilowatt hours of electric energy, or a country-wide
average of 1.28 lbs. per kilowatt hour.2 The same average is given for New
England. If the available plant requiring 0.75 lb. of coal per kilowatt hour
generated is compared with the actual steam plants in New England, the
available saving is 0.53 lb. per kilowatt hour. Regular full-load operation
may be assumed to average 5,300 hours a year; therefore each kilowatt of
existing capacity will require 2,800 lbs., or 1.4 tons, more than modern
plant. With coal at $5.00 per ton, the average excess cost is $7.00 per year
per kilowatt of installed capacity. This is equivalent to 6 per cent on $117,
compared with $100 of modern plant cost per kilowatt. Merely as an aver-
28. See FEDERAL PowER ComlmissioN, CONSUMPTION OF FUEL FOR PRODUCnION OF
ELEcrRIc ENERGY: 1942, Table I, pp. 2-3. This table presents, by months for 1942 and total
for the year, the short tons of bituminous coal consumed for production of electric energy,
total kilowatt hours generated during the year, and the pounds of coal per kilowatt hour,
for the United States as a whole, for each region, and for each state within each year.
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age, therefore, the available coal saving alone would render existing New
England steam plants entirely obsolete.2-
The economic advantage of new plant in each region, or for each com-
pany, would depend upon the available coal saving, the cost of coal, the
interest rate on new funds, and the cost per kilowatt of new plant. Surveys
would have to be made separately for each company. The determination
should include available savings not only in coal consumption but ao in
labor and materials for operation and maintenance.
For transmission, distribution and general plant, no convenient standard
of comparison between existing and available plant can be adopted for
illustration. However, the forces of depreciation have been at work, and
their effect should be ascertained. Surveys of transmission and distribu-
tion lines would establish their suitability compared with new ones that
could be provided now; the latter might have different capacities, different
location, superior materials, and would involve more efficient methods of
construction. The relative over-all economy and suitability would establish
the depreciation of the existing lines.
Determinations of this nature would require detailed facts and estimates
and would involve differences of opinion and conflicts of interest. Simpli-
fication could be achieved, however, by holding close to established plant
ages and annual depreciation rates on which agreement can often be reached.
Whatever the difficulties encountered, they should be met squarely and sen-
sibly. Definite results will have to be established within the vast reaches
of existing indefinitenesses; ascertainment of depreciation is essential for
initial establishment of prudent investment and is unavoidable if future
regulation is to be effective.
Future Definite Provisions. Once the initial findings of existing depre-
ciation have been officially set and the reserves adjusted accordingly, the
annual depreciation rates applied to different classes of property can be
readily estimated on the basis of the reasonable life expectancy indicated by
physical and technological prospects and can be adjusted with recognized
change in expectations. The same amounts would be entered as charges to
operating expenses and as credits to the reserve, and relative equity and
definite balance between consumers and investors would be maintained.
When, however, excessive or inadequate provisions became apparent, revi-
sion in subsequent depreciation rates would be made. The goal would be
to keep as close as practicable to the actual development of depreciation
while presenting throughout exact amounts for purposes of regulation.
To carry through the depreciation program as outlined will require, first
29. This summary analysis is based generally on 14,000 b.Lu. coal. Whcre the b.tu.
- content is materially less, the calculation would have to be adjusted accirdingly.
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of all, adequate legislation. This should convey to the commission in each
state the power and duty to establish a definite system of regulation based
factually upon accounts and records. It should fix standards and prescribe
procedure as far as practicable both for the initial determination and the
subsequent accounting. It should provide sufficient funds and appropriate
personnel.
The commissions should be lifted from their prevalent political and easy-
going levels to competent, public-minded, vigorously functioning bodies
which realize that they are entrusted with great powers and responsibilities
for the protection and advancement of enormous public interests. There
is no more important matter of postwar planning and transformation if
the general system of private utilities under state regulation is to be main-
tained against the encroaching establishment of outright public organiza-
tion and management.
REPLY TO MR. FERGUSON
'In the September issue of the Journal Mr. SAmuel Ferguson, President
of the Hartford Electric Light Company, presented a critical discussion
of my proposals for the establishment of a "prudent investment" rate base."0
Mr. Ferguson's position may be briefly stated as follows:
First, that while the proposed prudent investment rate base is presented
as a quantum of cost, it is in reality one of value."1 He views depreciation
as a value category, with no causal or logical relation to cost. The latter he
regards as a fact established once and for all through purchase or installa-
tion, not subject to diminution through the forces of depreciation. 2 Sec-
ond, that the depreciation concepf and accounting as presented constitutes
in fact amortization of investment and not depreciation. 8 Third, that the
depreciation provisions as outlined are destructive of the underlying in-
vestors' rights.8 4 Fourth, that the depreciation accounting and treatment
for rate-making purposes as set forth would prompt the utility managements
to make uneconomical plant replacements.35
The first point has already been discussed at some length. As has been
stated," the prudent investment concept here presented is definitely one of
cost and not value in the commercial sense. The charges for depreciation
to operating expenses and the credits to the reserves are in fact cost alloca-
30. Ferguson, "Cost" as a Substitute for "Vahe" in Utility Rate Base Determination:
A Comnwnt on Dr. Bauer's Position (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 721.
31. See id. at 721, 723-4.
32. See id. at 723-4.
33. See id. at 732.
34. See id. at 731.
35. See id. at 721, 727-30.
36. Supra, pp. 93-5.
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tion , not value adjustments. The original cost of plant units is gradually
absorbed by the charges to operating expenses for depreciation as the total
economic serviceability of the plant units diminishes with operation and age.
And, while accruing depreciation is determined in relation to available new
plant units, its entry into the accounts is purely a cost allUocatiun.
Mr. Ferguson's second point may be disposed of along with his first. The
current accounting represents throughout depreciation as total plant service-
ability declines and not amortization of investment. The depreciation pro-
cesses fully preserve or maintain the investment as made, providing regu-
lar replacement of the accruing depreciation through the immediate cash
assets retained in the business. The investment is kept permanently unim-
paired and intact. In contrast, amortization gradually extinguishes the
amount of original investment over a period of time. Mr. Ferguson has
confused the two opposite accounting objectives and procedures.
His third point, that the depreciation provisions are destructive of under-
lying investors' rights, is also a misconception. The outright purpose is to
establish, maintain and protect equally the relative rights of investors and
consumers. The question is whether the accounting squares with the ob-
jective. The answer appears indubitable. Capital cost as initially incurred
is manifestly the measure of original investment. This amount, plus sub-
sequent further investments in plant additions, is regularly maintained
through the plant and depreciating accounting, and it constitutes the rate
base on which a fair return would be allowed at all times through the rates
paid by consumers. Manifestly there can be no impairment or confiscation
of investment, directly or indirectly.
On this point, Mr. Ferguson produces an illustration intended to demon-
strate inequitable reduction of return to stockholders as a result of the
depreciation procedure."' However, what he attempts to show deals with the
rate of return allowable on the rate base and not with the rate base itself,
the sole subject of discussion in both the June and present articles. The rate
of return should, of course, be fair; and, naturally, confiscation of investors'
rights can be effected by fixing an unfair rate of return as well as by adopt-
ing an inadequate rate base.
Extensive consideration of what is a fair rate of return cannot be at-
tempted in this abbreviated reply, but a summary disposition will be pre-
sented under Mr. Ferguson's fourth point, that the depreciation accounting
would result in uneconomical plant replacements. First, he obviously mis-
understands.the accounting process and, second, he again shifts from rate
base to rate of return. When complete depreciation accounting has been
provided, the rate base cannot be reduced or increased by retirement and
replacement of depreciated plant items. Consequently, there would be no
37. See Ferguson, supra note 30, at 727-8.
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motive for the management either to discard plant units prematurely or to
continue them in operation longer than economically justified.
In contrast, however, if Mr. Ferguson's proposal of gross plant costs,
without the depreciation accounting and the reserve deduction,as were adopt-
ed as the rate base, the management would be induced to keep fully depre-
ciated plant units beyond the time when economically they should be retired.
As long as they are continued in pretended use, they would be kept in the rate
base at full original cost, but, when retired, the rate base would be reduced
by the amount of the original cost. Thus retirement would be postponed
as long as specious justification, such as peak use, reserve, or standby, could
be concocted for the continued benefit of the company and its stockholders.
This 'unhappily has, often been the situation under past rate base standards
and procedure.
Mr. Ferguson fails to face the clear rate base situation just presented.
His point is predicated upon illustration, iot explicit investment analysis,
and it involves rate of return instead of investment. He takes the original
plant costs of his own company, $40,000,000, deducts the depreciation
reserve, $10,000,000, and so presents the prudent investment rate base at
$30,000,000. On this net investment he assumes a 6.5 per cent rate of return,
or $1,950,000 per annum. Included in the $40,000,000 plant costs'is the
sum of $3,000,000 for "an old low pressure steam plant built 40 years ago."
This is considered suitable to meet reserve needs, while $4,000,000 would
have to be spent for new generating capacity if the old plant were retired.80
By this presentation of facts, Mr. Ferguson attempts to show that, with
the prudent investment rate base, the company would derive an advantage
from premature retirement of the old plant. Upon retirement the original
cost of all the properties would be reduced from $40,000,000 to $37,000,000,
and upon installation of the new plant the amount would be advanced to
$41,000,000. With the retirement of the old unit, the reserve would be
diminished from $10,000,000 to $7,000,000. The net rate base after the
retirement would still be $30,000,000, as before, but with the new plant in-
stallation would be increased to $34,000,000, on which a return of 6.5 per
cent would come to $2,210,000, or an advance of $260,000 over the return
prior to the replacement. Mr. Ferguson assumes that the $4,000,000 for the
new plant units could be borrowed at 3 per cent, and so would cost $120,000
a year, against the gain of $260,000 in the return obtained at 6.5 per cent
on the total rate base. The retirement and replacement would thus yield
an unwarranted advantage of $140,000 to the stockholders. 40.
With the facts just as stated and assumed, Mr. Ferguson is right: the
management would be prompted to make premature replacements. But the
38. Id. at 730.
39. Id. at 728-9.
40. Id. a 729.
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trouble is not in the rate base, but in the relation of the rate of return to the
assumed interest rate. Naturally, if the company is allowed a 6.5 per cent
return on the prudent investment rate base while it can get capital funds at
3 per cent, it will profit from premature replacements. Mr. Ferguson is
wrong, however, even in the consideration of his figures on his theory. If
undepreciated original cost were adopted as the rate base, the annual return
at 6.5 per cent on $40,000,000 would be $2,600,000, instead of $1,950,000
on prudent investment (and here is the lure of the proposal), while after the
retirement and replacement the rate base would be $41,000,000 and the
return at 6.5 per cent would be $2,665,000. The increase in return would
be only $65,000 against the additional interest cost of $120,000 on the bor-
rowed funds. Under this situation, there would be uneconomically delayed
instead of premature replacement.
The trouble both ways is in the relation of the 6.5 rate of return to 3 per
cent for the cost of borrowed money. The two percentages are incongruous.
When funds can be borrowed at 3 per cent, a 6.5 per cent over-all rate of
return is unwarranted. Naturally, just as there should be no profit to the
company in juggling the rate base, so there should be no advantage in traf-
ficking between money rates. The rate of return should be adjusted to basic
costs of moneys; there would then be no profit or loss in premature or de-
layed replacements. But this is another story.
